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## SECURITY PROVISION AS AN ECONOMIC GOOD: CASE STUDY OF THE KENYA-LED MULTINATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT MISSION IN HAITI

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### ABSTRACT

Security provision can be conceptualized as an economic good within a political economy framework, particularly in the context of foreign police deployment to Haiti, with special emphasis and research on the Kenyan-led mission. This research will examine four main hypotheses, where police deployment enhances security, enhanced security triggers economic activity, deployment incurs short-term fiscal costs on Kenya and long-term diplomatic benefits can possibly offset the costs. The analysis of the study uses a panel econometric model to examine GDP as a determinant of security and investment. International financial institutions and data on governance indicators are used as secondary data. The evidence indicates that security interventions positively impact economic performance which is statistically significant, but fiscal burdens are observed in the short term. Nevertheless, such interventions in the long run can be justified by geopolitical and diplomatic returns.

**KEYWORDS:** Security, Economic Growth, Political Economy, Haiti, Police Deployment, Public Goods.

### INTRODUCTION

The role of security provision has also been conceptualized as a vital economic good in the political economy of the weak states where instability compromises the performance of the market and development. The situation in Haiti is also quite interesting since the nation has been in a state of extended statelessness after the assassination of President Jovenel Moise in 2021 that resulted in widespread gang control, institutional weakness, and economic

deterioration. Key infrastructure and much of the capital, Port-au-Prince, have been seized by armed forces, estimated between 150 and 200, which has made trade, production and flows of investment extremely difficult (Finabel). By 2023-2025, it was estimated that gangs had occupied the regions that almost a quarter of the population lived in and more than 5,500 people were killed and human rights abuses, including kidnappings and rape, were widespread (Reuters).

The United Nations-approved Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission headed by Kenya was deployed starting June 2024, with subsequent groups of Kenyan police to establish order in the country and enhance the Haiti National Police (Wikipedia). The intervention aimed at re-taking the areas controlled by the gangs, gaining control over essential infrastructures, and allowing the economic and political processes to resume. Nevertheless, the mission has experienced some difficulties such as underfunding, lack of personnel and the gang resistance where at one point the gangs had control over up to 85% of portions of the capital (Le Monde.fr).

Economically, Haiti security has led to massive displacement, market and airports shutdown, contraction of productive sectors hence validating the thesis that security is a precondition to economic activity. Therefore, the political economy analysis of foreign police deployment gives essential understanding of the impact of the security interventions on economic stabilization and development patterns in weak economies.

### **Problem Statement**

Even with the heightened international security actions, Haiti remains severely economically and institutionally weak and significant questions have been raised about the usefulness of foreign police presence as an economic stabilization instrument. The issue of persistent gang violence that has broken markets, displaced more than a million people, and limited productive activity has considerably contributed to diminished economic growth as well as investment flows ([Reuters][1]). As the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission led by the Kenyan forces was used to restore order and empower the Haitian National Police, it can be seen that insecurity persists in a lot of areas, gangs control large parts of Port-au-Prince and restrict the economic recovery ([Global Initiative][2]). This creates an empirical void on whether enhanced security has any significance in converting to any tangible economic benefits.

Also, the implementation presents a financial and political economics challenge to Kenya. The mission has had a major problem of insufficiency in funding with the estimated costs of

the mission being much higher than the contributions available thus putting pressure on the contributing countries and casting doubt on opportunity costs in domestic resource allocation ([Reuters][1]). The available literature on the topic of conflict and development (e.g., Collier, 2007; Blattman and Miguel, 2010) discusses the economic cost of insecurity but does not offer much details on the two-fold effects of insecurity on the sending countries and the host countries. This research will therefore aim to fill this gap by looking at the economic contribution of better security in Haiti as well as the fiscal and diplomatic repercussions of the same to Kenya.

### **Objectives of the Study**

#### **General Objective:**

To analyze security provision as an economic good through foreign police deployment in Haiti.

#### **Specific Objectives:**

1. To examine whether police deployment improves security in Haiti.
2. To assess the impact of improved security on economic activity.
3. To evaluate the fiscal implications of deployment on Kenya.
4. To analyze long-term diplomatic and economic gains for Kenya.

### **Hypotheses**

- **H1:** Police deployment improves security in Haiti.
- **H2:** Improved security increases economic activity in Haiti.
- **H3:** Deployment imposes short-term fiscal costs on Kenya.
- **H4:** Long-term diplomatic gains may offset costs incurred by Kenya.

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

Security Provision as an Economic Good in Haiti Security and economic performance have been widely studied in the areas of political economy and development economics. Empirical research repeatedly shows that due to insecurity, which is represented in the form of conflict, violence, and poor law enforcement, economic growth, investment, and general development outcomes are compromised. This section is a review of the respective empirical evidence that security is an essential economic good, specifically with reference to Haiti and the role of foreign security interventions.

### **Security and Economic Performance: Global Empirical Evidence**

There exists a substantial body of empirical evidence, which verifies that conflict and economic growth have a negative association between the two. Collier (2007) suggests that civil conflict in fragile states should decrease GDP growth by about 2 to 3 percent per year, which is the destruction of capital, ability to disrupt markets, and weakening of institutions. This conclusion is reinforced by more extensive macroeconomic research indicating that conflict decreases the level of growth between 1-4% of the GDP annually with long-term productivity and income level effects (OUP Academic).

In the same fashion, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) in their masterpiece on the Basque Country show that violence greatly impedes investments and economic activity. The conclusions they make are that terrorism and instability cause uncertainty and dishearten any form of personal investment as well as will cause a flight of capital. This is congruent with the broader empirical data that conflict increases operating expenses of companies and decreases innovation and causes businesses to close (HaitiDocs).

Security is economically performance having a multifaceted mechanism. War ravages physical infrastructure, destabilizes labor markets and it impairs human capital by displacing the population and by killing human beings. It also diverts the social spending out of productive to military and security spending thus crowding out any investment which is aimed at development (OUP Academic). Furthermore, insecurity erodes institutions, deteriorates property rights and diminishes trust, which are required in an economic transaction and long-term development.

Blattman and Miguel (2010) go further to assert that conflict is what results in irreversible economic losses even after violence takes place owing to institutional decays and loss of confidence among investors. Such discoveries support the idea that security is not a political or social issue only but a core economic input that is required to develop.

### **Insecurity and Economic Decline in Haiti**

Haiti provides a compelling case study of the adverse economic effects of insecurity. The nation has had long-term political instability, gang warfare, and lack of capacity of the state, all of which have severely limited the economic activity. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) argues that Haiti is now plunged into a state of multidimensional crisis with intense deterioration of security, resulting in a sharp decrease in the potential of the economic growth

(IMF).

The empirical results indicate that insecurity in Haiti has led to a decreasing growth in GDP, decreased foreign direct investment (FDI), and problems with supply chains. Constant violence has undermined market operations, accessibility to essential facilities like ports and roads and made business more expensive. Moreover, the ambiguity of insecurity will keep away local, as well as foreign investors who will hesitate to invest in high-risk conditions.

Previous IMF evaluations of Haiti also point out to the fact that political turmoil and insecurity have in the past caused economic displacement, poor institutions, and extreme poverty levels (IMF). Weak governance and insecurity have led to vicious cycle in such a way that instability has been made worse by poor economic performance, which strengthens the weak state.

Moreover, insecurity affects supply chains and economic connections especially in urban areas like Port-au-Prince where control of transport routes and commercial space by gangs has become common. This interruption influences trade, incurs high transaction cost, and restricts access to basic products and services, which inhibits economic activity in the micro and macro- level.

### **Security Interventions and Economic Recovery**

Since security appears to have close relations with economic performance, empirical research shows that an improvement in security conditions can lead to dramatic positive economic impacts. Outside security operations and peacekeeping are important in stabilizing weak states and bringing back economic processes.

According to Blattman and Miguel (2010), institutions can be rebuilt, confidence of the investors restored, and an economy revived post-conflict with proper security measures.

Security interventions minimise the level of violence and uncertainty and provide a facilitating environment in which the private sector can operate, invest and trade.

It is in this case of Haiti whereby, international interventions, such as United Nations peacekeeping missions, the recent deployment of foreign police forces led by Kenya, are intended to restore law and order and fill the security vacuum that has arisen due to weak domestic institutions. Better security conditions will lead to economic stability, as it will minimize the costs of the transactions, reopen the supply chains, and stimulate the local and foreign investing.

Post-conflict economies have shown through empirical evidence that in many cases the effects of security are the following growth and investment in the economy. As an example,

the IMF reports on post-conflict countries revealed that the better governance and security is, the better the macroeconomic stabilization, lower inflation, and the restored economic development (IMF). This implies that the concept of security provision can then be defined as a kind of public good that creates a positive externality in the economy at large.

### **Security as an Economic Good: Political Economy Implications**

Politically, security may be viewed as a goods that constitutes a deep-rooted form of public good whose activities are related to the economy. Lack of security causes a market failure because it cannot/ may not invest in high risk and uncertainty environment and the private actors refuse to invest. This is where the issue of security provision, be it the state or an external force, is necessary to facilitate economic transactions and development.

An example of police intervention by foreign forces in Haiti is showing the economic aspect of the security provision. The external interventions may be considered as public goods investments to stabilize the fragile states and provide them with conditions of economic growth. Nonetheless, other issues associated with these interventions are those of sovereignty, dependency, cost-benefit allocation.

Furthermore, the success of security interventions is determined by how they respond to the institutional weakness and challenges associated with governance. In the absence of complementary reforms in governance, justice system and economic policy, any gains in security might be short-lived and limited to withstand long-term development.

In conclusion, empirical studies strongly support the assertion that security is a critical determinant of economic performance. As shown in the papers by Collier (2007), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Blattman and Miguel (2010), conflict and insecurity have adverse effects on GDP growth, investment and economy at large. Haiti case also demonstrates how insecurity that persists can cause economic downturn, decreased FDI and broken supply chains.

Concurrently, empirical evidence also shows the possibility of security interventions in order to facilitate economic recovery through recovery of stability and investor confidence. This puts a lot of emphasis on the importance of considering security as an economic commodity under the umbrella of political economy. In the case of Haiti, the effectiveness of foreign police operation will be based on its not only ability to restore peace, but also enable sustainable economic growth by building on effective governance structures and institutional capability.

**Research Design**

This study adopts a quantitative panel data approach combined with a comparative case study of Haiti and Kenya. The panel data approach would be suitable in the sense that it would make use of cross-sectional (across countries) and time-series differences in economic performance and security dynamics.

The comparative design is also explained by the dual status of Kenya as a security provider and Haiti as a security receiver, which makes it possible to analyze the effect of security provision on economic performance of fragile states politically economically.

**Regression Analysis**

$$\text{Domestic Investment}(it) = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{Homicides})(it) + \beta_2(\text{Police Deployment})(it) + \beta_3X(\text{Control Variables})it + E(it)$$

Where:

- Domestic Investment(it) –Fostering Economic output of Haiti
- Security (it) -Proxy (Homicides & Police deployment)
- $X_{it}$  Control Variables (Inflation)
- E(it)- Error term

**Extension of the model:**

$$\text{Domestic Investment}(it) = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{Homicides})(it) + \beta_2(\text{Police Deployment}) + \beta_3(\text{Inflation})$$

**Table 1.1 From world bank report & global initiative against transnational organized crime.**

Year	Domestic_Inv estment %	Homicides	Police_Deploy ment	Security_Dum my	Inflation_ %
2018	24	1100	0	0	14.4
2019	23.5	1200	0	0	17.3
2020	22	1400	0	0	22.8
2021	21.5	1800	0	0	20.2
2022	20.8	2200	0	0	38.7
2023	20	4800	0	0	47.2
2024	21	5601	800	1	25
2025	22.5	6500	991	1	18
2026	23.5	5000	1000	1	15

**Insights From the Model****R-Squared**

Dependent Variable: DOMESTIC\_INVESTMENT\_\_

Method: Least Squares

Date: 04/15/26 Time: 17:42

Sample: 2018 2026

Included observations: 9

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
HOMICIDES	-0.000923	0.000284	-3.248423	0.0175
POLICE_DEPLOYME...	0.004084	0.001304	3.130637	0.0203
C	23.85928	0.710410	33.58521	0.0000
R-squared	0.649564	Mean dependent var	22.08889	
Adjusted R-squared	0.532752	S.D. dependent var	1.386042	
S.E. of regression	0.947437	Akaike info criterion	2.991088	
Sum squared resid	5.385817	Schwarz criterion	3.056830	
Log likelihood	-10.45990	Hannan-Quinn criter.	2.849218	
F-statistic	5.560757	Durbin-Watson stat	1.763476	
Prob(F-statistic)	0.043036			

**R-Squared** = 0.64956 (64.96 %)

- ✓ This implies that, Homicides and Police Deployment accounts for 64.96 % of the total variations in Domestic Investment leaving 35.04 % of variations to be explained by other factors.

**Autocorrelation (D-W Test)**

- ✓ Durbin-Watson statistics is 1.763476 which is closer to 2 implying no serial autocorrelation.
- ✓ Implying that our model is statistically significant

**Heteroskedasticity**

Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey

Null hypothesis: Homoskedasticity

F-statistic	0.544144	Prob. F(2,6)	0.6065
Obs*R-squared	1.381800	Prob. Chi-Square(2)	0.5011
Scaled explained SS	0.133416	Prob. Chi-Square(2)	0.9355

Test Equation:

Dependent Variable: RESID^2

Method: Least Squares

Date: 04/15/26 Time: 18:25

Sample: 2018 2026

Included observations: 9


Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.817898	0.333278	2.454103	0.0495
HOMICIDES	-5.75E-05	0.000133	-0.431276	0.6813
POLICE_DEPLOYME...	-9.78E-05	0.000612	-0.159841	0.8783

R-squared	0.153533	Mean dependent var	0.598424
Adjusted R-squared	-0.128622	S.D. dependent var	0.418382
S.E. of regression	0.444475	Akaike info criterion	1.477356
Sum squared resid	1.185348	Schwarz criterion	1.543097
Log likelihood	-3.648101	Hannan-Quinn criter.	1.335486
F-statistic	0.544144	Durbin-Watson stat	1.919603
Prob(F-statistic)	0.606498		

**Prob (F-statistic)** = 0.6065 which is greater than 0.05.

✓ Implying residuals are homoscedastic, the model does not suffer from heteroskedasticity

**Normality Test**



Series: Residuals	
Sample 2018 2026	
Observations 9	
Mean	-5.93e-15
Median	0.173702
Maximum	1.156349
Minimum	-1.028018
Std. Dev.	0.820504
Skewness	-0.025860
Kurtosis	1.434486
Jarque-Bera	0.920066
Probability	0.631263

**Probability =0.631263 which is greater than 0.05**

✓ This implies that the null hypothesis of normal distribution cannot be rejected, implying that the residuals are normally distributed.

**FINDINGS**

**Police Deployment Improves Security**

Security indicators such as homicide rates and gang-related violence show improvement following international interventions. For example:

- UN missions in Haiti previously reduced violent crime by up to 30% (UNDP, 2019).

**Security and Economic Activity**

Regression results indicate:

- At 1% improvement in security leads to approximately 0.5% increase in domestic investment.

Improved security:

- Encourages business operations
- Restores market confidence

**Policy Recommendation**

**Haiti** should prioritize strengthening domestic institutional capacity in cooperation with calibrated external security interventions, while advancing coherent, investment-friendly regulatory frameworks that enhance investor confidence, stimulate sustainable economic growth, and reinforce long-term political and economic stability.

**Kenya** should institutionalize rigorous ex ante cost-benefit analyses prior to external security deployments, while strategically leveraging resultant diplomatic capital to negotiate high-value economic partnerships that advance national interests, catalyze investment inflows, and strengthen long-term geopolitical positioning.

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