
INTERNATIONAL TRADE FINANCE ACTIVITIES OF THE BANQUE DE L'INDOCHINE (1875-1945)

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ABSTRACT

This article provides a systematic analysis of the mechanisms and operational scale of international trade finance executed by the Banque de l'Indochine in Vietnam during the 1875–1945 period. Harvesting colonial financial archives, annual corporate reports of the Banque de l'Indochine, and official maritime customs statistics, this study exposes the institutional monopoly maintained by the bank in coordinating import-export credit lines, documentary credits, and foreign exchange guarantees. The empirical findings indicate that trade finance operations conducted by the Banque de l'Indochine were not designed to establish an equitable free-trade environment; rather, they were engineered to serve the strategic interests of French corporate syndicates, optimizing the extraction of raw materials (specifically rice, rubber, and minerals) while securing a captive market for metropolitan industrial goods. Leveraging a branch network strategically positioned across key Asian and European port cities, the Banque de l'Indochine exercised absolute dominance over Indochina's international payment flows. The study concludes that these trade finance mechanisms functioned simultaneously as a catalyst for modernizing foreign trade payment infrastructures and as a core structural link in the colonial economic surplus extraction apparatus.

KEYWORDS: Trade finance; Banque de l'Indochine; Import-export credit; Colonial trade; Financial history of Vietnam.

1. INTRODUCTION

In the historical trajectory of Indochina's integration into the global trading system from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, the establishment of a modern commercial credit and international payment network played a decisive role. The inception of the Banque de l'Indochine in 1875 marked a new era in controlling commercial financial flows within Vietnam and the broader Southeast Asian region (Meuleau, 1990). Vested with exclusive currency issuance privileges and acting as the official fiscal agent for the colonial state, the Banque de l'Indochine rapidly emerged as the supreme institution dominating international trade finance, ranging from extending short-term credits for agricultural and mineral exports to discounting commercial bills and providing foreign exchange services (Aumiphin, 1994). However, the expansion of trade finance operations conducted by the Banque de l'Indochine did not operate under the market principles of perfect competition. On the contrary, it was intrinsically linked to authoritarian commercial protectionism and the structural colonial economy imposed by the French administration (Robequain, 1944). A rigorous investigation into the instruments and operational mechanisms of trade finance utilized by the Banque de l'Indochine during 1875-1945 is vital for elucidating how French finance capital manipulated import-export supply chains, controlled the balance of payments, and suffocated the growth of indigenous merchant classes.

2. MATERIALS AND METHODS

2.1. Archival Data and Primary Sources

This study is constructed upon the systematic collection and processing of primary historical archives retrieved from the National Archives Centers of Vietnam (specifically the Fonds of the Governor-General of Indochina and the Fonds of the Department of Commerce) alongside institutional banking repositories in France. The primary dataset comprises:

- Annual balance sheets, board of directors' reports, and general shareholder meeting minutes of the Banque de l'Indochine spanning from 1875 to 1945 (Banque de l'Indochine, 1930).
- Official commercial and maritime navigation statistics promulgated by the Government-General of Indochina, capturing import-export cargo volumes, trading partner destinations, and balance of payments metrics (Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine, 1900).
- Commercial documentary letters of credit (L/C) guarantees, bill-discounting dossiers for rice and rubber exports, and wartime foreign exchange control regulatory files.

2.2. Research Methodology

To achieve its analytical objectives, this paper implements an interdisciplinary methodology synthesizing economic history, banking finance analysis, and international trade theory:

- *Historical Periodization and Logical Method*: Applied to analyze the structural evolution of the trade finance policies enforced by the Banque de l'Indochine across critical historical milestones: the establishment of branch networks and credit frameworks (1875-1900); the expansion phase driven by rice and rubber export booms (1901-1929); and the era of credit restructuring and exchange controls during the Great Depression and World War II (1930-1945) (Brocheux & Hémery, 2009).
- *Financial Analysis and Quantitative Historical Method (Cliometrics)*: Employed to extract, synthesize, and compute quantitative metrics, including the ratio of short-term commercial credit balances to the total assets of the Banque de l'Indochine, the geographic distribution of import-export financing (between France, French colonies, and Asian markets), and net profit margins derived from foreign exchange arbitrage (Murray, 1980).
- *Comparative Historical Method*: Executed by contrasting the trade finance mechanisms of the Banque de l'Indochine in Vietnam with British colonial commercial banking models (such as HSBC or the Chartered Bank) operating in India and Malaya. This method highlights the high degree of institutional concentration and the intimate symbiosis between French banking capital and the protectorate state aimed at neutralizing competition from domestic enterprises (Norlund, 1986).

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

3.1. Monopoly Establishment and the Structural Trade Finance Network

The analysis of archival documents reveals that the establishment of the Banque de l'Indochine in 1875 was not merely the creation of a conventional commercial bank; rather, it represented the institution of a financial monopoly structure designed to serve France's overarching foreign trade strategy in Indochina. Empowered by exclusive currency issuance privileges and acting as the official fiscal agent for the colonial administration, the Banque de l'Indochine rapidly engineered a strategic branch network connecting key port cities such as Saigon, Haiphong, Hanoi, Tourane (Da Nang), alongside major international financial and commercial hubs in Asia including Hong Kong, Singapore, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Bangkok, and its executive headquarters in Paris (Meuleau, 1990).

This transnational network enabled the Banque de l'Indochine to exercise near-total authority over Vietnam's foreign trade payment flows. The bank established a monopolistic framework

governing the issuance of Letters of Credit (L/C), documentary credit guarantees, and commercial bill discounting. Financial data spanning 1885 to 1914 indicate that over 85% of Indochina's total import-export transaction value was processed through payment instruments controlled or intermediated by the Banque de l'Indochine (Banque de l'Indochine, 1930). By manipulating the discounting of export bills, the bank not only reaped substantial profits from service fees and exchange rate spreads but also held decisive power over commodity flows and the timing of credit disbursements to merchants.

3.2. Import-Export Credit Allocation: Structural Asymmetric Bias

Discussions regarding the fundamental nature of trade finance operations conducted by the Banque de l'Indochine highlight a pronounced structural inequality within its credit allocation policies. Rather than acting as a neutral catalyst for free-market trade, the bank's credit capital was systematically allocated to prioritize French corporate conglomerates and metropolitan merchants (Aumiphin, 1994).

Statistical findings demonstrate that export trade finance was heavily concentrated on two strategic commodities: Cochinchinese rice and natural rubber. Between 1900 and 1930, short-term advances extended for the procurement, transport, and export of rice accounted for 60% to 70% of the total commercial credit balance at the Saigon branch. French import-export firms (such as Denis Frères and L'Union Commerciale Indochinoise) enjoyed preferential credit lines characterized by lower interest rates, flexible terms, and lenient collateral requirements. Conversely, Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese merchants despite controlling the extensive rural collection networks for paddy could access capital only at inflated interest rates through financial intermediaries or by satisfying draconian collateral mandates (Murray, 1980).

Regarding import finance, the Banque de l'Indochine implemented a discriminatory credit policy specifically designed to shield French industrial goods. The bank prioritized L/C issuance and bill discounting for textiles, machinery, and chemical products imported from France at subsidized service rates. In contrast, imports originating from non-French foreign territories faced punitive exchange conversion fees and rigid credit barriers. This institutional bias explains why Vietnam's foreign trade structure remained tightly tethered to the French metropolitan market throughout the colonial era (Robequain, 1944).

3.3. Foreign Exchange Manipulation and Economic Surplus Extraction

A critical empirical insight from this study concerns the mechanism of foreign exchange manipulation executed through trade finance operations. Because Indochina operated under a silver standard regime (the Piastre) while France adhered to the gold standard (the Franc),

fluctuations in international silver prices generated persistent foreign exchange risks in international trade settlements. The Banque de l'Indochine leveraged its monopoly position to shift these systemic risks entirely onto indigenous producers while capturing supernormal arbitrage profits (Brocheux & Hémery, 2009).

In rice export finance contracts, the Banque de l'Indochine routinely pegged bill discount rates to exchange parities favorable to the bank at issuance, but converted final payouts to local farmers and buying agents based on the lowest prevailing market price for silver. When global silver prices appreciated, the bank retained the windfall gold/silver spread; when silver prices plummeted, the bank immediately curtailed credit limits and inflated risk insurance surcharges. Furthermore, when the Piastre was arbitrarily hard-pegged to the French Franc in 1930 at an overvalued rate (1 Piastre = 10 Francs), trade finance operations froze overnight as Vietnamese agricultural exports lost all price competitiveness across Asian markets, precipitating widespread bankruptcy among peasant farmers in Cochinchina (Murray, 1980).

Dual Extraction Mechanism of Colonial Trade Credit:

$$\text{Bank Surplus} = (\text{Gold/Silver Exchange Parity Spread}) + (\text{Discriminatory Interest Differential}) + (\text{Monopolistic L/C Fees})$$

Outcome: The Banque de l'Indochine maximized financial profitability while local agricultural producers and indigenous merchants absorbed the brunt of market exposure and currency volatility.

3.4. Discussion: Modernization of Payment Infrastructure vs. Colonial Extraction Instrument

Grounded in the empirical results, a nuanced historical debate emerges regarding the dual role of the Banque de l'Indochine in Vietnam's financial development. On one hand, it is undeniable that the Banque de l'Indochine introduced and operated a modern Western trade finance infrastructure within Vietnam. The deployment of commercial bills, Letters of Credit (L/C), bank guarantees, and multilateral clearing networks provided the foundational architecture for modern foreign trade payment systems, accelerating commercial capital accumulation and integrating Indochina into global trade circuits.

However, in terms of structural essence, these trade finance instruments were engineered and operated as a sophisticated mechanism for economic surplus extraction. The convergence of currency issuance privileges and an absolute monopoly over import-export credit transformed the Banque de l'Indochine into a "state within a state." The bank did not aim to foster an autonomous domestic economy or facilitate capital accumulation for indigenous enterprises;

rather, it subordinated the entire commercial credit ecosystem to the principles of the *pacte colonial*. Complete reliance on colonial credit channels effectively marginalizing Vietnamese merchants from international trade, perpetuating an underdeveloped colonial economic structure highly vulnerable to global financial shocks (Norlund, 1986).

4. CONCLUSION

This study provides a comprehensive clarification of the role, operational mechanisms, and economic impacts of international trade finance executed by the Banque de l'Indochine in Vietnam from 1875 to 1945. By synthesizing its currency issuance privileges with a transnational settlement network, the Banque de l'Indochine not only instituted an absolute monopoly over import-export credit instruments but also transformed the trade finance ecosystem into a structural vehicle for colonial surplus extraction. The bank systematically prioritized preferential credit lines and discounting facilities for French corporate syndicates, accelerating the export of raw agricultural and mineral resources while converting Indochina into a captive market for metropolitan manufactured goods (Aumiphin, 1994).

Although the trade finance activities of the Banque de l'Indochine facilitated the introduction of modern foreign trade settlement mechanisms such as Letters of Credit (L/C), commercial bills, and bank guarantees into Vietnam, the core architecture of this system remained deeply discriminatory. Through the strategic manipulation of exchange rate volatility between the silver-standard Piastre and the gold-standard Franc, the bank successfully externalized systemic currency risks onto indigenous merchants and agrarian producers (Meuleau, 1990). Furthermore, the hard-pegging of the Piastre to the French Franc in 1930 underscored the catastrophic consequences of a dependent credit-monetary policy, which paralyzed export trade and plunged Vietnam's agrarian economy into severe distress (Murray, 1980).

In conclusion, the history of trade finance under the Banque de l'Indochine offers enduring insights into the imperative of constructing an independent national banking system, wherein foreign trade credit mechanisms serve as an equitable catalyst for national economic growth rather than an extractive instrument dominated by foreign capital.

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